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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
to social guests as a group is to hold them entitled to reasonable
care. This is not to emphasize particularly the desirability of decisions
in favor of plaintiffs in" tort cases, but rather- to provide a more ef-
fective and practical means of enabling the courts to consider all
relevant circumstances in each case. Hence it is urged that when
confronted with this problem the Virginia courts adopt either the
Restatement rule or the due care standard rather than extend the gross
negligence theory of liability.
TIMOTHY G. IRELAND
BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO PERPETRATORS OF CRIMES
In criminal law, a difficult problem sometimes arises in those
cases involving two persons when it is not clear whether one or both
of them committed the crime. If the evidence shows that only one
person could have committed the crime, the prosecution certainly
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt which person is guilty.' If,
however, it appears that the two persons co-operated in the crime, it
would seem that the prosecution should not be required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the exact part played by each.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina was recently confronted
with this problem in State v. Hargett.2 According to the state's evi-
dence, Weingardner, Parrish and two other soldiers left Fort Bragg
in Weingardner's car and drove to a nearby town. On reaching their
destination, Weingardner remained at the home of a friend, while
Parrish and others, later joined by Hargett, visited several food
and liquor establishments. When Weingardner rejoined the group he
was drunk and quarrelled with Parrish. Later, Parrish, Hargett and
Weingardner left in Weingardner's automobile for the ostensible
.purpose of putting Weingardner on a bus for Fort Bragg. After
twenty minutes, Parrish and Hargett returned, asserting that they
had done so.3 Three days afterward the body of Weingardner was
131 Atl. 501 (1925); Schmidt v. George H. Hurd Realty Co., i7o Minn. 322, 212 N.W
903 (1927); Roper v. Commercial Fibre Co., 1O5 N.J.L. 10, 143 At. 741 (1928);
Le Roux v. State, 307 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E.2d 386 (1954); Caldwell v. Village of Island
Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952); Hise v. City of North Bend,. 138 Ore.
15o, 6 P.2d 3o (1931). See also Prosser, Torts § 78 (2d ed. 1955).
'Aylward v. State, 216 Ala. 218, 113 So. 22 (1927).
2255 N.C. 412, 121 S.E.2d 589 (196i).
3Later in the evening Hargett said that Weingardner was in his (Hargett's)
car. In referring to this acknowledgement, the Supreme Court said that if Parrish
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found in a ditch at the city dump. An autopsy showed the cause of
death to have been drowning.
Hargett was indicted for murder. At his trial, Parrish testified
that Hargett drove the car to the dump, and, after a brief altercation,
shoved Weingardner into the ditch. This testimony was in direct
conflict, however, with the statement made to the police by Hargett in
which he said that Parrish was the one who hit the deceased and
pushed him into the ditch. The jury returned a verdict that Hargett
was guilty of manslaughter.
Hargett appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed on the ground that there was error in the instructions given to
the jury. The lower court had given instructions embodying the pro-
secution's contention that even if Hargett was not guilty as a principal
in the first degree, he might be guilty of aiding and abetting. 4 The
instructions on the law of aiding and abetting were correct, but the
Supreme Court thought there was no basis for a conviction as an aider
and abettor,a stating that Hargett could be guilty only as a perpe-
trator. A new trial was ordered.
Although there was no affirmative testimony at the trial that the
defendant was an aider and abettor, it can hardly be said that he
was a disinterested bystander.6 At the trial, Parrish accused Hargett
of committing the crime, whereas, in an earlier statement Hargett had
was the perpetrator the statement might be evidence of Hargett's guilt as an ac-
cessory after the fact, but was not sufficient to make him an alder and abettor.
'A principal in the first degree actually commits the crime with his own hands.
State v. Allison, 2oo N.C. i9o , 156 S.E. 547 (i93i). A principal in the second degree
is not the perpetrator, but one who is present at the commission of the crime and
either aids and abets, counsels, commands or encourages its commission. Spradlin
v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523, 79 S.E. 2d 443 (1954). The distinction between the
two is usually of little importance other than for descriptive purposes, since the
degree of guilt for each is usually the same, State v. Holland, 211 N.C. 284, 189
S.E. 761 (1937). Only in those cases where some factor of mitigation or aggravation
applies to one and not the other will the punishment vary as between the two. Red
v. State, 39 Tex. Crnn. App. 667, 47 S.W 1003 (1898).
5The Supreme Court felt that the evidence only showed that Hargett was at
the dump with Parrish, and that he did not attempt to prevent the crime. Mere
presence at the scene of the crime of a person who does not in any way participate
in or encourage its comnision does not make an alder and abettor. The court
also stated that Hargett could not be considered an aider and abettor on the
theory that he was bound to impede the commission of the felony or to recover
the deceased from the ditch.
OGenerally, a bystander is one who is present at the scene of the felony, but
who does not act in concert with those who commit it. Hilmes v. Strobel, 59 Wis.
74, 17 N.W 539 (883). To be guilty as an alder and abettor, the evidence must
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he participated in the crime before or at
the time of its occurrence. Drury v. Terntory, 9 Okla. 398, 6o Pac. soi (igoo).
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said that Parrish perpetrated the crime. Neither admitted that one
perpetrated the crime with the other present aiding and abetting.
However, it would not be inconsistent with either man's statement to
find that one did aid and abet the other in the commission of the
crime.
Furthermore, it was disclosed at the trial that both Parrish and
Hargett were together for the greater part of the evening; that they
told their friends they were going to the bus station to put Wein-
gardner on a bus, when in fact they took him to the city dump; that
Hargett drove Weingardner's car to the dump; that they were pres-
ent at the scene of the crime; that neither interfered to prevent
the crime, nor to recover Weingardner from the ditch; and that Har-
gett attempted to conceal the crime.7 From these facts it would seem
a jury might reasonably conclude that Hargett either perpetrated
the crime or aided and abetted in its commission.3
Even though there was no concrete evidence of Hargett's aiding
and abetting, it does not necessarily follow that an instruction relat-
ing to this degree of crime was wrong. In many jurisdictions,9 the
jury may convict the defendant of a lesser included offense even
though the evidence shows the greater offense.' 0 Once convicted, the
defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that the court
erred in instructing on the less serious crime as to which there was
no evidence." The theory is that the accused is not prejudiced by an
instruction that he can be convicted of a crime of a less serious nature
than the one for which he should be convicted.i
2
Therefore, in State v. Hargett, if the punishment for aiding and
7Although not disclosed at the trial, it may also be assumed that both were at
the dump on their own accord, since neither testified otherwise.
'Notwithstanding that these facts, when considered separately, do not have
much legal significance, yet when they are considered by the jury in connection
with other circumstances, they indicate that one was the perpetrator of the
crime and the other an aider and abettor.
"Some of these jurisdictions are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
For cases upholding this rule in the above jurisdictions see: Annot., 21 A.L.R.
6o3, 622 (1922); Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1097, i1o (1923); Annot. 102 A.L.R. 1019, 1026
(1936).
"North Carolina holds that if the evidence warrants a conviction of a higher
degree of homicide and does not warrant an acquittal, the jury can find the accused
guilty of a lower degree. State v. Matthews, 142 N.C. 621, 55 S.E. 342 (19o6); State
v. Branch, i93 N.C. 621, 137 S.E. 8o (1927).
"State v. Bidwell, i5o Wash. 656, 274 Pac. 716 (1929).
"People v. Wolcott, 137 Cal. App. 355, 30 P.2d 6oi (1934).
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abetting was less than that for perpetrating the crime, the former
would be a lesser included offense. Accordingly, an instruction, on
aiding and abetting, even though the evidence did not show such,
would not be prejudicial error. There is no reason why this rule should
not also apply if the penalty imposed on a perpetrator of a crime
and one who aids and abets is of equal degree. Consequently, even if
the giving of the aiding and abetting instruction was error, it hardly
seems to have been prejudicial error.
A somewhat different approach could also be taken. In all crim-
inal trials, the burden as to those facts which are material to the
crime rests on the prosecution.13 Evidence must be produced to over-
come the presumption that the accused is innocent 14 and to establish
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.15 Thus, where the perpetrator
of a single crime must be one of two persons, the evidence afford-
ing no reasonable inference that they acted in co-operation, the
burden is upon the prosecution to prove one or the other of them
guilty.16 If there is a reasonable doubt as to which of the two perpe-
trated the crime, the doubt will operate so as to require an acquittal of
both.17
State v. Hargett, however, can be distinguished from the above
situation since the state had evidence tending to show that both par-
ticipants were guilty. The difficulty was that the state did not have
enough evidence to show the part that each played in the crime. But,
when it can be inferred that both parties are guilty, is it necessary
for the state to prove their respective roles in the crime?
The doctrine of the "non-shifting" burden of proof in criminal
trials has become a firmly implanted principle of law due to the ab-
sence of affirmative pleadings by the defendant, and the general policy
nState v. Helms, 181 N.C. 566, 107 S.E. 228 (1921); State v. Kline, i9o N.C.
177, 129 S.E. 417 (1925); State v. Walker, 193 N.C. 489, 137 S.E. 429 (1927). See 1
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 16 (12th ed. 1955).
"The presumption of innocence cautions the jury to consider only the evi-
dence, and that they should not make any surmises based on the present situation
of the accused. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2511 (3 d ed. 194o).
5If a juror has a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused he cannot vote
for a conviction. State v. Ellis, 2io N.C. 166, 185 S.E. 663 (1936). In defining
"reasonable doubt" Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts said: "It is not mere
possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on
moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of
tile case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they can not say they feel
ani abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge." Common-
wealth v. Webster, 59 Mass (5 Cush.) 295 (185o).
16Aylward v. State, 216 Ala. 218, 113 So. 22 (1927).
" People v. Woody, 45 Cal. 289 (1873).
266 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
of caution in favor of accused persons.' 8 Nevertheless, this rule has
been relaxed in some jurisdictions which hold that the burden of
producing evidence, in certain instances, may be upon the accused19
Thus, if the prosecution has established proof which would con-
vince the jury of the defendant's guilt, the accused has been placed
in a position where he should go forward with countervailing evi-
dence.20 Although the defendant is not required to do so, 2 1 his failure
to present rebutting proof may be regarded as confirming the con-
clusion indicated by the evidence shown by the prosecution.22 Hence,
many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, place on the accused
the burden to show certain facts in the nature of excuse or mitiga-
tion;23 to prove that he acted in self-defense; 24 to rebut the presump-
tion of malice arising from the use of a deadly weapon; 25 to establish
intoxication at the time of the crime; 2
6 and to establish insanity.2 7
The defendant's duty to produce contervailing evidence has been
interpreted to mean that the accused must support his cause by those
facts peculiarly within his knowledge.28 This rule might be extended
"i Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 81(b) (t899).
"Although the burden of producing evidence as to certain facts may be upon
the defendant, the burden of ultimately convincing the jury, beyond a reasonable
doubt remains upon the prosecution. See Cardozo's reasoning in Morrison v.
California, 291 US. 82, 88 (1934).
'Lee v. State, 259 Ala. 455, 66 So. 2d 881 (1953).
"Hurston v. State, 235 Ala. 213, 178 So. 223 (1938); State v. Davis, 214 N.C.
787, 1 S.E.d io4 (z939).
2rhe -viewpoint is that once the prosecution has presented evidence which
the accused could explain or deny, the accused's failure to testify raises a strong
inference that he cannot truthfully explain or deny them. Vanderheiden v. State,
156 Neb. 735, 57 N.W.gd 761 (1953); State v. Anderson, 137 N.J.L. 6, 57 A.9d 665
(1948); State v. Levine, 117 Vt. 320, 91 A.ad 678 (1952).
"1State v. Whitson, iii N.C. 695, x6 S.E. 332 (1892); State v. Jones, 98 N.C. 651,
3 S.E. 507 (1887).
EState v. Barringer, 114 N.C. 84o, 19 S.E. 275 (1894).
-Mealy v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 585, 115 S. E. 528 (1923).
"State v. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, ioo N.W 638 (19o4).
"People v. Allender, 117 Cal. 81, 48 Pac. 1014 (1897); Commonwealth v. Ber-
chine, 168 Pa. 603, 32 AtI. log (1895).
'For example, in a case in which the defendant's whereabouts at the time
of a crime is in question, the burden is on him to show where he was, as this
knowledge is peculiarly within his power. White v. State, 31 Ind. 262 (1869). Many
states have passed statutes making the proof of certain facts a prima facie showing
of unascertained facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. People v.
Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 286 Pac. 1025 (193o). Therefore, if the crime charged involves
proof of a negative (i.e., that defendant did not have a license to carry a pistol)
which is difficult to prove and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant,
proof of the doing of the prohibited act (i.e., carrying a pistol) makes out a prima
facie case for the state and the burden is cast upon the accused to disprove the
negative. McHenry v. State, 58 Ga. App. 410, 198 S.E. 818 (1938). In support of
